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Oc-tober 22, 1969 
' 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE s 1300:) 
WITIIDRA W AL FROM VIETNAM 
Mr MANSF'IELD. Mr. President, I 
have ·come across a column by Joseph C. 
Harsch enlitled "How Fast?" havtn>: to 
do with the situation in Vietnam and Lhe 
practical and realistic difficulltes m 
which the President of the United States 
finds himself. The article reads. m part: 
The-ro cnn be no clcnr or sure nnswer. 
That is. to the question of withdrawal. 
It !las to be a variable. It must dep('nd on 
tile capaolt.y or tile south VieLnatn ann'd 
forces to provide the necessary security for 
the wit.hd!-.\Wal. And that certainly does mell.n 
more time than either the Pres ident or the 
"moratorltun" marchers would like to leave. 
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Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this column and a very worth-
while editorial by Hedley Donovan, en-
titled "Winding Down the Wa.r on Our 
Own " which explains realistically the 
situS:tton in which the President and we 
find ourselves in Vietnam, be printed in 
the RECORD. 
There being no objection, the material 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 
as follows: 
[From the Chrl.stlan Science Monitor, Oct. 
21, 19691 
How FAsr? 
(By Joseph c. Harsch) 
WASHINGTON.-ln one sense the Issue be-
tween President Nixon and the peace dem-
onstrators Is now narrow. Everybody (al-
most) wanta pes.ce. Everybody (almost) 
agreee that American combe.t forces should 
be withdrawn. Whe.t remains as e.n Issue 
Is only the speed of the withdrawal. 
It Mr. Nixon would even fix e. spectfic de.te, 
much ot the opposition to him would <Usa.p-
pee.r. It he fixed an ee.rly de.te, most of It 
would cUsa.ppee.r. 
At thls point there e.re some very ree.l e.nd 
eerlous military !e.ctors. 
ABSTRACT THEORY 
In &bstract theory It would be physically 
possible to pull the entire he.l!-mllllon men 
out In a month. 
By com.ma.ndeering cruise liners from the 
aea and pa.ssenger e.lr-llners from the sky a 
mass ll!t In SO de.ys could be done. 
Obviously, no sensible person would dream 
of doing the withdrawal the.t we.y. The equip-
ment could not be te.ken out e.t any such 
pace. To lee.ve the equipment behind 1n a 
crash withdrawal program would probably 
amount, 1n etrect, to giving most of It, per-
he.ps all, to the VIet Cong and North VIet-
nam forces. 
The essential military point Is that a sud-
den withdre.wal could all too easily degen-
erate Into a fighting withdraw&!. 
The present Nixon plan calls for the grad-
ual withdrawal ot United Ste.tee combat 
force&, leaving e.lr support, co=unlcatlons, 
and supply until the le.st. 
But lee.vlng perhe.ps a que.rter of a million 
Americans ot those types 1n VIetnam with-
out American Infantry protection could be 
extremely dangerous. It would be possible 
only 1! the South VIetnam Army oould be 
relied upon to provide the necesse.ry security 
tor the noncombat people. 
POLITICAL CHAOS 
And time Is an e88entlal element In the 
ce.pe.clty of the South VIetnam Army to pro-
vide the.t protection. A eudden withdrawal 
would almost certe.lnly mean political chaos 
In Saigon tollowed by the breakup or the 
South Vietnam e.rmed forces. The retreat 
!rom the Ye.lu during the Koree.n we.r Is an 
example ot what could all too easily happen 
under such circumstances. Zenophon's fight-
Ing retreat trom Asia Minor Is another. Mr. 
Nixon, understandably, de.re not order the 
kind or withdrawal program which could lead 
to a Dunkirk. 
So how tast can the withdrawal be man-
aged without running the serious risk ot a 
Dunkirk? 
There can be no clear or sure answer. It 
has to be a variable. It must depend on the 
capac1ty or the South Vietnam armed !orces 
to provide the necessary security for the 
withdrawal. And that certainly does mean 
more time than either the President or the 
·•morator~um·· marchers would like to leave. 
THEORETICAL MERIT 
The moratorium deadline Is the end of 
1970 Mr. Nixon would be delighted to get 
every last American out ot VIetnam by No-
vember of 1970. Such a deadline would be 
manna from heaven tor every Republican 
running for reelection that month. 
But a November, 1970, deadline would 
probably not be safe. 
What then could Mr. Nixon do with safety 
to American troops beyond what he has al-
ready done? 
One useful Idea. le provided by Human 
Events, the right-wing lntormatlon sheet. It 
sa.ys he should send home all conscripts ar•d 
use only volunteers In Vlel,nam. The Idea haa 
great theoretical merit, and would be wel-
come In many quarters at the Pentagon, l! 
enough time Is provided. It would probably 
te.ke most of a year to do It safely. You can't 
risk the breakup or mixed volunteer-con-
script unlts at the front. 
Another measure would be to announce 
a deadline tor final withdraw&! at a safe time 
In the future. Dec·~mber, 1970, Is probably 
not sate. November of 1972 ought to be sate_. 
WINDING DOWN THE WAR ON Qua OWN 
(By Hedley Donovan) 
Richard Nixon has said he does not pro-
pose to be the first American President to 
Jose a war. He might, however, It he and we 
e.re lucky, become the third President to set-
tle tor a tie. The others were James Madison 
(War ot 1812) and Dwight Eisenhower (Ko-
rea), perfectly respectable company tor any 
President to keep. 
The President waa strangely tense and 
rigid In hls advance comments on the Viet-
nam Moratorium (he would "under no cir-
cumstances .. . be affected whatever"). 
Many of the Oct. 15 people, to be sure, 
would not be appeased by anything Mr. 
Nixon could do, short or Immediate and to-
tal withdrawal. Yet Mr. Nlxon·s VIetnam 
policy Is a great deal more realistic and hu-
mane than he Is getting credit for, In part 
because he and his admlnlstratlon explain 
It so badly, In part because criticism ot the 
war he.s reached so high an emotional pitch. 
The President has In fact begun a uni-
lateral withdrawal of the bulk of American 
forces !rom Vietnam. 
The President has In fact reined In his 
commanders so closely that In some areas 
of VIetnam a kind or unllnteral cease-fire 
prevails. 
What else should he do? Nlxon·s acts o! 
de-escalation go further than many VIetnam 
dissenters were demanding only a year ago. 
But the point Is, of course, that now is a 
year later. LIFE believes there Is more the 
President could be doing to turther the pros-
pecta tor a tolerable outcome In Vietnam: 
In his dealings with hls own men In Wash-
Ington, with the Saigon government, with 
Hanoi, and In his dealings with U.S. opinion, 
which Is his most critical negotiation of all. 
To start with, we propose that the policy-
makers of the Nixon administration begin 
treating with U.S. opinion in its own right, 
not as though Its chief Importance lay In 
the Interpretation Hanoi places upon lt. Mr. 
Nixon, much to his credit, ha.s never since 
his Inauguration put public blame on the 
Johnson administration tor his Vietnam bur-
den. But he has allowed his administration 
sometimes to sound like the dug-In L.B.J., 
equating the VIetnam dissent with aid and 
comtort to the enemy. 
It Is a profound question how-and 
whether-a democracy should conduct a war 
with only, say 60 % ot public opinion In sup-
port. Our Constitution specifies no fewer 
than nine matters, none as serious as a war, 
which require a two-thirds vote for congres-
sional approval. When we are In a war which 
has never had explicit congressional sanc-
tion, and never even been legally ""declared." 
being fought In good part by draftees (chosen 
by a fantastically cnprlclous system). a war 
which many (LIFE Included) have thought 
Important to win but almost nobody has 
ever claimed was Imperative, and when this 
war has dragged on lnconclusl vely for years, 
the wonder Is not that there Is protest but 
that there Is so much wllllngness to serve 
and sacrifice. Mr. Nixon. and Mr Agnew, too, 
would do better to marvel at the stahllit' 
and patience or the nation they are prl Yl -
leged to lead, rather than purse llps and 
wonder how Ha.nol Is reacting our stuclent' 
today. 
Once we start thinking or American ani-
tudes about Vietnam as Important for tl1elr 
own sake, not as mirror messages being 
fiashed from here to Hanoi and back. sHernl 
things tall Into place. 
We should stop expecting anything out of 
the Paris peace talks. In recent months the 
North Vietnamese have not budged one cen-
timeter. (How could a Harvard demonstra -
tion make them more Intransigent?) We 
should proceed on the assumption there will 
be no formal settlement with the North. We 
should of course keep our delegation In 
Paris, talking and listening. There are some 
things the U.S. government should be saying 
to America Itself, to South Vietnam and to 
Southeast Asia that might conceivably In-
terest Hanoi. It so. fine; but 1! not, our 
policies must proceed tor our own good 
reasons. 
We should be withdrawing our troops , In 
Hubert Humphrey·s good word, "systemati-
cally." This means a fairly firm presidential 
timetable, which no doubt exists. The Presi-
dent Is right to resist any public promise to 
be totally out of Vietnam by some early. 
exact date, despite the 57"'o Gallup Poll tn 
favor or Senator Ooodell"s resolution com-
mitting us to be gone by the end of 1970. But 
Mr. Nixon should conquer the press-confer-
ence refiex that leads him to try to outbid 
the Goodells and Clark Clll!ords, suggesting 
that such critics Interfere with his hopes of 
getting out sooner. We have little enough 
bargaining power vls-a-vls Hanoi since It Is 
so clear that we e.re disengaging, and since it 
Is unthinkable that we could re-escnlntc. 
short of some monstrous provocation. 
The American public, we would guess. Is 
wllllng to support 12 to 18, maybe at most 24 . 
more months of mllltary effort In Vletne.m If 
withdrawals are In progress and If casualties 
and costs are decllnlng steadily. 
The President has already ordered with-
drawals of 60,000 men trom our peak strength 
of 540,000, a.nd there are hints that he may 
announce another cut before the end or the 
year. Civilians need not be too diffident 
about entering the numbers game, for It Is 
essentially an appraisal of American senti-
ment rather than a technical mllltary judg-
ment. For our part, we hope that the Presi-
dent Is aiming at a torce no bigger than 150.-
000 by mld-1971. (We st111 keep 50.000 men tu 
Korea. 16 years after the truce.) Whether 
there should be such a rear guard at all 
(chlefiy In logistics and air support) could 
Indeed be a subject of negotiation. and Is 
not a point to be given away for nothing. 
The hope Is that as we withdraw the Sou th 
Veltnamese army will be Improving fast 
enough to take over more and more of the 
fighting and the South Vietnamese govern-
ment will be broadening Its support. It may 
just work. We should press Thleu and Ky on 
bureaucratic corruption, land reform and 
polltlcal Imprisonments. 
We should continue shifting the U.S mili-
tary effort away from the "maximum pres-
sure" concept toward population prot ecllon 
and training ot the ARVN. The new policy 
has contributed to a marked reduction of 
American casualties, now at their lowest level 
In nearly three years. Secretary Rogers thinks 
the enemy, however unyielding at Paris. has 
carried out a "very significant•• de-escalation 
In the field, cutting down troop Infiltration 
from the North by as much as two thirds 
Mllltary brass In Washington and Saigon 
continue the somewhat ritualistic warning 
that this may just be the lull before a n<'w 
offensive. Mr. Nixon should decide whether 
he agrees with his Secretary of State. and 
If so, perhaps hasten his next troop with-
drawal announcement. 
The President has promised a major Viet-
nam speech !or November 3. It Is none too 
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soon. we hope he will redefine what is still 
at stake for us in VIetnam. We hope he will 
ol1er ::. generous vision of a long-term peace-
time American lnlerest in the development 
of Southeast Asia and friendship for all Its 
peoples. (What Bil Irony that we should be 
on fairly good terms with Communist Rus-
'la. talk!ng cautiously about a possible thaw 
In relations wllh Communist China, and st!ll 
so bl tterly embroiled with one of the smallest 
Communist states.) 
It will take even more steadiness than the 
American people have already shown If they 
are to persist through this winding-down 
phase of the war and bear further casualties 
and costs for modest objecllves. In this diffi-
cult undertaking, the President deserves our 
sympathy and support, and the country de-
serves vis! ble, candid and con vlncing lead-
ership. 
PROTECTIVE REACTION IN 
VIETNAM 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, there 
seems to be some difficnJty interpreting 
what Secretaries Laird and Rogers have 
sa.l.d about the new mi1itary strategy of 
"protective reaction" ordered last JnJy 
and put into effect last August. In my 
opinion, this is a decided shift away 
from the old "search and destroy" and 
"maximum pressure" tactics which were 
employed in the last administration and 
in the first months of the present admin-
istration. To me, the change means we 
have moved a long distance in the direc-
tion of a "cease-fire and stand fast" 
policy. It is my understanding of the new 
strategy of "protective reaction" that 
U.S. forces will fire only when a threat 
that they will be fired on is developing 
and that they remain prepared at all 
times to take whatever action may be 
necessary to repel any attack which 
shonJd be in the offing. 
It has been charged that this approach 
wonJd expose U.S. forces to increased 
casualties and wonJd hand an iniltiative 
to enemy forces. It wonJd be my belief 
that the opposite is the result; that 
casualties wonJd be decreased as, in faot, 
they have been reduced since the new 
strategy has been in effect. As far as the 
initiative is concerned, U.S. forces remain 
on guard at all times and take whatever 
actions are necessary to forestall any 
attack which might be in the offing bUJt 
fire only when there is a threat that they 
will be fired on. 
This interpretation of "protective re-
action" would appear to be consistent 
with what a military spokesman in 
Washington has said: 
Our defense a.ctlv1ties Include allied re-
connaissance in force, sweeps and extensive 
small patrol operations designed to keep the 
enemy off-balance and to prevent enemy 
at/tacks. 
Or, even more specifically, what an-
other military officer at the Pentagon is 
quoted as saying: 
We're not terribly far from such e. condi-
tion today (a "de facto cease-fire"). The 
enemy has pulled back to sanctue.rtee 
throughout VIetnam. Inflltratlon is way 
down. We're sendlng out lots ot small pa-
trols but we're no longer crashing through 
the bush with large units spoiling for a 
fight. Our concentration is on pacification 
and on helping the Vletnamese take over 
more or the war. Our ca.sulatles keep fall-
Ing, week by week. 
This is certainly a far cry from the 
tactics of "maximum pressure" and 
"search and destroy" and to me is an 
indication that the President is moving 
toward a cease-fire and standfast pol-
icy. 
I commend the Secretary of Defense 
for announcing the policy; the Secre-
tary of State for emphasizing It; and 
the President for iniLiating this new and 
highly significant tactic. 
Mr. President. in the Washington Star 
of October 11, just a week or so ago, ap-
peared an article by Mr. Orr Kelly. The 
article has to do with a press confer-
ence held by Brig Gell. John W. Barnes, 
former commander of the 173d Airborne 
Brigade in South Vietnam's Binh Dinh 
Province. I believe t.his WM the general 
referred to on Thursday, 2 weeks ago 
tomorrow. at Secretary Laird's press 
ijonference, ,.,..h-en he announced the new 
"protective reaction' policy. 
General Barnes until recently was in 
command of one of the most heavily 
Communist-infested areas in the coun-
try. He told newsmen he gave his 7,000 
troopers strict orders on their pacifica-
tion experiment begun on April 15. Gen-
eral Barnes' 7,000 troopers were ordered 
to fire only at uniformed enemy soldiers, 
or men who were clearly not friendly 
forces and persons engaged in hostile acts 
such as throwing a hand grenade. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an 
editorial entitled "Toward a Cease-Fire," 
which was published in the Baltimore 
Sun of October 21, 1969. 
There being no objection, the editorial 
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, 
as follows: 
TOWARD A CEASE-FIRE 
Reports from Washington that President 
Nixon Is considering a proposal for a cease-
fire In Vietnam are encouraging. as an in-
dication of e. continuing search for ways to 
scale down the scope and Intensity of the 
war. The American efforts In this direction-
steps which Include the cessation of the 
bombing In North VIetnam and revision of 
the "search and destroy" tactics--have un-
doubtedly been major factors In the general 
reduction in the so-called level of violence 
and, more Important, In the decrease In bat-
tle c'lSualties. A cease-fire propose.! could 
prope~ly be made In line with these steps 
and in llne with the measures being taken 
to withdraw substantial numbers of Ameri-
can soldiers from South Vlelnam. 
A proposal of this nature, first of all, would 
underscore the United States pollc], and 
hope, o! bringing lhe war to an end s soon 
as possible. A standsllll cease-fire, In which 
all troops would remain In place wilh com-
bat operations suspended. could possibly 
open the door to the negotiations for a po-
litical settlement which tbe United States 
bas been seeking. with little or no response, 
so far as the record shows, from North Viet-
nam. 
But even if serious peace negotiations did 
not develop, an American Initiative toward 
e. cease-fire could point to e.nolher way In 
which the war may be ended; that is, by 
a steady dwindling of fighting until an un-
declared and Ulmegotlated peace Is estab-
lished. For several years now, some authori-
ties have thought that the war may well 
be brought to an end In this manner, rather 
than through an openly negotiated settle-
ment. 
Mr. Nixon has strong support In this coun-
try now, we believe, for the measures he Is 
taking to control and decrcllt;e lhe IC\'Pl or 
lhe war. lt seems clear lhnt lhe Anwnc.,n 
people not only endorse lhese men"trcs but 
are urging the President to push on wi ch 
e.dditione.i sleps. The 'lmple fact is lhnt it 
becomes more and more dl!llcult lo jusclfy 
conlinued ballle deaths, even when lhe 
number of casualties has been greally r e-
duced, nfler the major decision has been 
taken to begin withdrawing American lroop,. 
This, we suggesl, was uppermost In the minds 
or many at the Americans who took part 
lasl week in the moratorium demonstrations. 
Mr. McGOVERN subsequently said. 
Mr. President, I wish to associate myself 
with the remarks of the distinguished 
majority leader w!th reference to his 
statement that we are, in fact, moving 
into a cease-fire. The Senator from Mon-
tana (Mr. MANSFIELD) has been advocat-
ing that position for several years, both 
under the previous administration and 
under this administration. I hope that is 
the direction in which we are moving. 
STATESMANSHIP BY SENATOR 
MANSFIELD 
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in 
the RECORD an editorial entitled "States-
manship by Senator MANSFIELD," which 
was published in the Philadelphia I n -
quirer this morning. The editorial is very 
praiseworthy of the positions taken by 
the distinguished majority leader and 
the Senator from Arkansas <Mr. FuL-
BRIGHT). While I have not cleared this 
matter with the majority leader, I wonJd 
like to have it printed in the RECORD at 
this point. 
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. In light 
of the Senator's statement, the Chair is 
quite certain the majority leader would 
impose no objection. Without objection, 
it is so ordered. 
The editorial, ordered to be printed in 
the RECORD, is as follows: 
STATEMANSHIP BY SENATOa MANSFIELD 
As Democratic Majority Leader In the Sen-
ate, and a long- time advocate of peace In 
Vietnam, Mike Mansfield took the Sennle 
fioor to deliver a statesmanlike address that 
ought to be a keynote for Americans, what-
ever their party, who genuinely seek an end 
to the war. 
Noting that the Nixon Administration Is 
pursuing a new policy In Vietnam, dedicnled 
to de-escalating the fighting and reducing 
casualties and bringing U .S. troops home, lhe 
fen:\tor from Montana declared: "I would 
like to see lhe people of this nation get be-
hind President Nixon .... I want to say as 
a Democrat lhat It will be my intention lo 
support lhe President." He went on to ex-
press his belief that slrong public support 
for 11.1r. Nixon at this critical juncture In 
peace errorls would expedile a "respons!IJie 
settlement" In VIetnam. 
There is great wisdom as well a.<; high 
stat-esmanship in Senator Mansfield's re -
marks. At lhls time, of all limes, .rith tile 
President of the United Stales lnilialing bold 
str>ps townrd a reduction of the flgh t.ing 
Wllile engaging In delicate diplomatic ma-
neuvers lo has len a selllement. 1 he Arneric~n 
people should sland united. rather than di-
vided, and should demonslrn.te support. in-
stead of protest. for lhe U .S. pence o!Ten>;i vo 
that Is already uncler way and Is being 
acceieraled. 
Chairman J. W. Fulbright o! the Senate 
Foreign Relallons Committee, one of lhe 
mosl outspoken war crlllcs, has acted sen-
sibly in following Senator Mansfield's lead by 
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postponing committee hearings on VIetnam 
that had been scht.duled to begin next week. 
They wm be del:~yed at lee.st until after 
President Nixon's addresa to the nation on 
November 3, when he IB to discuss the VIet-
nam situation. 
There are, of course, some people In this 
country who claim to be for peace but really 
seek a Communist victory. It can be expected 
that they will continue to fan the Hames ot 
dissension wherever they ce.n. Other Amer-
icans. those who want to act responsibly In 
the cause of peace, ought to rally to the call 
of Senator Mansfield. 
Octobe1· 22, 1969 
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